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  Abstract 
This paper provides a theoretical rationale for non-binding retail price recommendations 
(RPRs) in vertical supply relations. Analyzing a bilateral manufacturer-retailer relationship 
with repeated trade, we  show that linear relational contracts can implement the surplus-
maximizing outcome. If the manufacturer has private information about production costs or 
consumer demand, RPRs may serve as a communication device from manufacturer to 
retailer. We characterize the properties of efficient bilateral relational contracts with RPRs 
and discuss extensions to settings where consumer demand is affected by RPRs, and where 
there are multiple retailers or competing supply chains. 
Keywords 
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 1 INTRODUCTION 2
1 Introduction
Retail Price Recommendations (RPRs) from manufacturers to retailers are ubiqui-
tous, and they come in many forms: They are printed on the packing of consumer
goods (groceries, body care, etc.), listed on internet platforms and commercial web-
sites (e.g., ebay.com, bmwusa.com), and attached as “sticker prices” to durable
goods displayed on retailer premises (e.g., automobiles, home appliances).1 Yet,
RPRs may also be privately communicated to retailers and thus be unobservable to
consumers. A key feature of RPRs is that they are non-binding in nature, that is, in
contrast to Resale Price Maintenance (RPM), the manufacturer does not retain the
right to control the retail price (Mathewson and Winter, 1998, 58).
Despite the ubiquity of RPRs, it is probably fair to say that the economic ra-
tionale for making RPRs is not very well understood. Why do manufacturers rec-
ommend retail prices if retailers are free to ignore their recommendations? The
literature suggests two answers to this question. First, there may be a behavioral
motive if RPRs directly affect consumers’ willingness to pay. Assuming that con-
sumers suffer from loss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991; Kahneman et al.,
1991) if the effective retail price exceeds the recommended retail price, Puppe and
Rosenkranz (2006) show that a monopolistic retailer may voluntarily adhere to the
recommended price.2 Second, there may be an anticompetitive motive. If RPRs fa-
cilitate collusion among retailers (Bernheim and Whinston, 1985; Mathewson and
Winter, 1998; Faber and Janssen, 2008), retailers may voluntarily adhere to them.3
Both motives indicate that, to make sense of RPRs, it is crucial to understand the
conditions under which retailers voluntarily adhere to such recommendations.4
Inthispaper, weproposean alternativeapproachthatreliesneitheronthebehav-
ioral nor on the anticompetitive motive. Instead, we add two important ingredients
to the analysis that have found little interest in previous work. First, we observe
that vertical supply relationships usually offer repeated trade opportunities. That
is, supply relations are typically long-termed. Long-term supply relations are com-
mon for the provision of branded consumer products (e.g., cosmetics, watches, and
clothing) and even for entire retail chains.5 Second, we note that manufacturers are
often better informed about their own production costs than retailers. This seems
1Recommended retail prices are also known as manufacturer’s suggested retail prices (MSRPs).
2These authors demonstrate that, if consumers’ loss aversion becomes very strong, the manufac-
turer recommends a price close to the monopoly price.
3Recent work by Jullien and Rey (2007) further suggests that, if retailers adhere to RPRs, manu-
facturers may also employ RPRs to facilitate collusion among manufacturers.
4Note that if one is willing to assume that manufacturers have “other” (i.e., non-modeled)means
of pressuring retailers into adherenceto RPRs, there is no clear distinction between RPRs and RPM.
5For instance, Marks & Spencer, one of the UK’s leading retailers, is foundto have little turnover
in its suppliers, and “some of its relationships are more than 100 years old” (Kumar, 1996, 105).1 INTRODUCTION 3
particularly relevant in the context of the provision of assembled products such as
automobiles, computers, or mobile phones.
We show that these two ingredients together suggest a novel and rather different
motive for making RPRs: With repeated interaction and asymmetric information
about production costs, RPRs may serve as a communication device from manu-
facturer to retailer. More speciﬁcally, RPRs may be part of an (implicit) relational
contract (Levin, 2003), communicating private information from manufacturer to
retailer which is crucial for joint-surplus maximization. In this relational contract,
thecomparativestatics ofwholesale and retail margins, respectively,are very differ-
ent from the standard setting without repeated trade. That is, along the equilibrium
path of the efﬁcient relational contract, an increase in marginal cost leads to an in-
verse variation of wholesale and retail margins, whereas the standard setting would
predict a proportional variation.6
The inverse variation of wholesale and retail margins is an implication of our
ﬁnding thattheefﬁcient relationalcontract must bestructured such thattheretailer’s
proﬁt is constant (i.e., independent of the manufacturer’s marginal cost) along the
equilibrium path. This ﬁnding follows from the fact that the manufacturer will rec-
ommend the retail price which maximizes jointsurplus (thereby truthfullyrevealing
marginal cost) only if he is made residual claimant to the effect of cost savings on
joint surplus—which necessarily requires that the retailer’s proﬁt is independent of
marginal cost. Since the retail price which maximizes joint surplus is increasing in
marginal cost, retail proﬁts can only be independent of marginal cost if the retail
margin is increasing (rather than decreasing) in marginal cost, offsetting the ad-
verse demand effect generated by an increase in marginal cost. Together with the
standard result that the total margin is decreasing in marginal cost, this implies an
inverse variation of wholesale and retail margins.
The relational contract which we characterize in this paper has a number of
desirable features. First, the contract solves a complex vertical coordination prob-
lem employing solely (i) a simple linear wholesale price scheme, (ii) linear RPRs,
and (iii) an implicit understanding of the costs and beneﬁts of adhering to the con-
tract. The simplicity of the contract may explain the prevalence of linear supply
schemes despite the well-known double marginalization problem in vertical supply
relations.7 It is also consistent with Kumar’s (1996, 105) observation that “compa-
nies that base their relationships on trust either have minimal contracts or do away
6Bresnahan and Reiss (1985) examine the proportionality of wholesale and retail margins in the
automobile industry. Steiner (1993) and Lal and Narasimhan (1996) highlight the possibility of an
inverse relationship between wholesale and retail margins, but these authors ignore the role of RPRs
in determining margins.
7The classic reference on double marginalization is Spengler (1950). See Tirole (1988) for a
textbook treatment.1 INTRODUCTION 4
with contracts altogether”.8 Second, implementing the proﬁt-maximizing outcome
places a very low ‘computational burden’ on the retailer: All the retailer needs to
do is follow the manufacturer’s recommendation. This is particularly convenient in
industries where production costs are volatile.9 Third, the relational contract pro-
duces more realistic predictions on how the surplus is split between manufacturer
and retailer than the standard one-shot setting without repeated trade.
We consider two major extensions to our basic setting. First, we study the case
whereRPRs notonlyconveyinformationtotheretailer, butdirectlyaffect consumer
demand as well.10 We show that the relational contract with RPRs can still imple-
ment the surplus-maximizing outcome, but the effective retail price may deviate
systematically from the RPR along the equilibrium path. This result is consistent
with the notion that consumer demand may be stimulated by ‘moon pricing’ (the
practice of setting ﬁctitiously high RPRs so as to fool consumers into thinking they
are buying at bargain prices). Second, we consider a setting where both the costs of
production and consumer demand may change over time. This is natural if the peri-
ods in our analysis are interpreted as product cycles, where a new period represents
the introduction of a new variety (a new pharmaceutical drug, a new car model,
etc.). We show that our results generalize naturally to this setting, even if the manu-
facturer has superior information on consumer demand (e.g., from pre-launch R&D
and marketing studies). The key difference to the basic setting is that the RPR now
has the more complex function of communicating information on both production
costs and consumer demand.
We also explain how to alleviate some limitationsof our approach. In particular,
we discuss the requirement that parties are sufﬁciently patient to make the relational
contract self-enforcing, the conﬁnement to linear tariffs, and the extent to which our
analysis generalizes beyond bilateral relationships.
This paper is related to the literatureon relational contracts and collusion. Baker
et al. (2002) and Levin (2003) investigate how history-contingent strategies in re-
peated games can substitute for court-enforceable contracts. In contrast to our set-
ting, transfers are allowed in every stage game in these papers. Athey and Bag-
well (2001) also consider how relational contracts can substitute for transfers, but
theyfocus on ‘optimal’horizontalcollusionand abstract from vertical relationships.
8This author also notes that the majority of wholesalers in Japan actually operate without (ex-
plicit) contracts.
9Using data from the Dutch gasoline market, Faber and Janssen (2008) examine whether RPRs
simply summarize how retailers should adjust retail prices to be in line with frequently changing
input prices. Their results suggest that RPRs also help to coordinate retail prices.
10The classical, behavioral reasoning is that the RPR’s effect on consumer demand derives from
‘mental accounting’ on consumers’ behalf (cf. Thaler, 1985). Alternatively, one might imagine that
the RPR contains actual informational value for rational consumers in a setting with asymmetric
information.2 REPEATED TRADE UNDER COMPLETE INFORMATION 5
Nocke and White (2007), in turn, consider vertical relationships, but their focus is
on showing that vertical integration facilitates horizontal upstream collusion, while
we analyze how RPRs can help establish vertical collusion (i.e., implement the
surplus-maximizing outcome) between manufacturer and retailer.
Our analysis is also related to the literature on repeated sequential games, as
the vertical supply relationship under study gives rise to a sequential stage game
where the manufacturer moves before the retailer. Wen (2002) provides a Folk the-
orem for repeated sequential stage games, and Mailath et al. (2008) study optimal
punishment in repeated extensive-form games with impatient players.11 In our set-
ting, the retailer can punish observable deviations by the manufacturer immediately
(i.e., within the same stage game), so that neither the standard Folk theorem (Fu-
denberg and Maskin, 1986) nor Abreu’s (1988; 1986) result on simple penal codes
apply. Nevertheless, we show that a simple linear relational contract with RPR can
implement the surplus-maximizing outcome.
Finally, our paper contributes to the literature on vertical contracting under
asymmetric information. One strand of this literature focuses on the case where
the retailer is privately informed and studies RPM or quantity ﬁxing arrangements,
respectively (Gal-Or, 1991; Blair and Lewis, 1994; Martimort and Piccolo, 2007).
Another strand of the literature assumes that the manufacturer has private infor-
mation on the demand for a new product and examines the role of signaling and
screening from the perspective of marketing research (Chu, 1992; Desai and Srini-
vasan, 1995; Lariviere and Padmanabhan, 1997; Desai, 2000). None of these papers
studies the role of RPR for vertical contracting under asymmetric information.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the
analytical setup and analyzes the full information version of the repeated sequential
game. Section 3 examines the repeated sequential game under the assumption that
the manufacturer is privately informed about the cost of production and derives the
key results of our analysis. Section 4 provides a number of relevant extensions and
limitations. Section 5 concludes.
2 RepeatedTradeandRelationalContractswithCom-
plete Information
This section shows how relational contracts can resolve the double marginalization
issue in a world of complete information and repeated trade: The prospect of con-
tinued future cooperation can entice parties to take actions which, rather than max-
11Other important contributions to the literature on repeated sequential games include Rubinstein
and Wolinsky (1995) and Sorin (1995).2 REPEATED TRADE UNDER COMPLETE INFORMATION 6
Manufacturer M marginal cost c
w (wholesale price)
Retailer R 1:1 transformation
p (retail price)
Consumers Demand D(p)
Figure 1: The Vertical Structure of the Supply Chain.
imize own short-run proﬁts, achieve joint-surplus maximization. We also argue,
however, that, when information is complete, this is possible without the explicit
communication of RPRs, which sets the stage for our later analysis of repeated
vertical trade under asymmetric information in Section 3.12
2.1 The Basic Stage Game
We embed our analysis in the classical model of double marginalization (Spengler,
1950), where a manufacturer M and a retailer R (the ‘vertical supply chain’) trade
to serve a retail market. M produces an intermediate good at constant marginal
costs c > 0. R in turn can transform this intermediate good into a ﬁnal good (for
simplicity, using a costless 1:1-technology), for which he faces a consumer market
with demand D(p), where D′(p) < 0, and D′′(p) < 0 for all p (see Fig. 1). Trade
proceeds as follows: M offers a wholesale price w at which R can buy an arbitrary
amount of units. R then sets a retail price p, after which demand D(p) material-
izes. Payoffs are thus pR(w,p) = (p−w) D(p) and pM(w,p) = (w−c) D(p),
respectively.
Let pM, pR denote payoffs in the (subgame-perfect) equilibrium of this game,
and p ,w the corresponding equilibrium prices. By the familiar double-marginaliza-
tion logic, pM +pR < p∗ ≡ maxp(pR+pM): Vertical externalities lead to a retail
price p which exceeds the price p∗ ≡ argmaxp(p−c) D(p) which an integrated
monopolist would charge.
12Formally, this section’s analysis is a special case of that in Section 3. Where therefore keep the
formal exposition as compact as possible and omit proofs.2 REPEATED TRADE UNDER COMPLETE INFORMATION 7
2.2 Repeated Play and Relational Contracts
Several remedies to the double-marginalization problem have been suggested in
the literature, such as the use of non-linear tariffs (i.e., letting M charge a ﬁxed
fee), or RPM (i.e., assigning M the right to control retail prices).13 This paper
investigates an alternative route to avoiding double marginalization by way of ‘re-
lational contracts’ (cf. Baker et al., 2002) in the context of repeated play of the
abovegame. This approach is motivatedby two observations: First, real-world rela-
tionships between suppliers and retailers typically are long-termed. Second, price-
recommendations may embody the communication of an implicit ‘threat’ from M
to R, in the spirit of “charge this retail price, or else...”. Such a threat only makes
sense in a world where M has a chance to react to R’s choice of p in the future.
Technically, we consider a repeated game in which the above game (the ‘stage
game’) is repeated ad inﬁnitum in periods t = 0,1,2,..., and parties discount future
payoffs at rate d ∈ (0,1). Following Levin (2003), a ‘relational contract’ represents
a complete plan for the relationship, specifying each party’s action for any possible
history of the game. It is ‘self-enforcing’ if it describes a perfect public equilibrium
of the repeated game.
It is easy to see that one equilibrium of this game is an inﬁnite repetition of
the stage-game equilibrium, resulting in payoffs pM, pR in every period. There
are, however, other equilibria. Particularly, consider the following ‘trigger-strategy’
equilibrium:
• M sets w = ˆ w for any history which does not contain M having set w  = ˆ w
or R having set p  = p∗ in any previous moves; M sets w = w (the one-shot
equilibrium wholesale price) otherwise;14
• R sets p = p∗ for any history which does not contain M having set w  = ˆ w or
R having set p  = p∗ in any previous moves; for all other histories, R plays
(myopic) best response to the w set by M in the current period.
It is easily checked that, for adequate choice of ˆ w (so that each party’s equilibrium
stage-game payoff exceeds its equilibrium payoff in the one-shot stage game) and
for sufﬁciently patient parties (d close enough to 1), the above strategies form a
subgame-perfect equilibrium.
The following features of this equilibrium are worth noting: First, the sum
of equilibrium payoffs is maximal in every round (because p = p∗), so double
marginalizationiseliminated. Second, thelevelof ˆ wreﬂects an(implicit)agreement
13Note that the double-marginalizationproblem will also disappear if R has full bargainingpower
(i.e., if he can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer concerning the terms of trade).
14Observe that, even if M cannot directly observe p, he is able to infer it from his realized proﬁts
at the end of the stage game because D′ < 0.2 REPEATED TRADE UNDER COMPLETE INFORMATION 8
on how the surplus from cooperation is to be divided between M and R, but does
not affect the size of the surplus (provided that ˆ w falls within the bounds described
above). As such, the repeated setting is more ﬂexible concerning the distribution of
surplus than the non-repeated setting, where full bargaining power somewhat artiﬁ-
cially rests with M (who can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to R). Third and ﬁnally,
the speciﬁcation of R’s strategy differs slightly from the usual formulation of trig-
ger strategies because the stage-gameitself is an extensive-rather than normal-form
game (essentially requiring optimality of R’s action not only contingent on actions
taken in previous rounds but also contingent on M’s action in the current round).
Naturally, there are many more equilibria in this inﬁnitely repeated game,15
which leads to the usual issue of equilibrium selection. As we will argue below, the
focus on efﬁcient equilibria can be justiﬁed by the fact that, for d large enough, the
joint surplus from the relational contract can be split among parties in an arbitrary
way (see Theorem 1 in Levin, 2003, for a similar argument).
2.3 Enter Retail Price Recommendations
To investigate the role of RPRs in this setting, assume now that, in every round,
in addition to naming the wholesale price w, M can name a recommended retail
price ˜ p ∈ R. What role might this non-binding communication play?
In the context of our above cooperative equilibrium, a ﬁrst superﬁcial inter-
pretation might view the RPR as an explicit communication of M’s strategy to R:
M might recommend ˜ p = p∗ in every round so as to make explicit that R setting any
other price will terminate cooperation. Strictly speaking, however, there is no need
for such communication in equilibrium: Nash equilibrium requires each party’s
strategy to be optimal given correct beliefs about the strategy of the other. Conse-
quently, in equilibrium, there is no point in such communication. In other words,
efﬁcientcollusionbetweenM andR (‘supplychainefﬁciency’)can beachievedwith
or without RPR because R knows the efﬁcient retail price p∗ (and he is assumed to
know that this is the focal point of coordination).16
Essentially, however, the remainder of our analysis will argue that this is an
artifact of the assumption of complete information. In reality, trade between M
15Observe that we cannot immediately apply to the standard Folk theorem to describe possible
equilibrium payoffs because the stage game is an extensive-form rather than a normal-form game
(see Wen, 2002, on applying the Folk theorem to repeated extensive-formgames).
16Given the multiplicity of equilibria, one might see a role for RPRs as a device for equilibrium
selection. Absent any clear theoretical underpinning, we shall not further investigate this role here.
Moreover, observe that communication of an RPR can only help in one dimension of the coordina-
tion problem: focussingon efﬁcient equilibria(the more‘obvious’part of the coordinationproblem),
but not on the problem of coordinating on the terms by which surplus is split (i.e., the equilibrium
level of w).3 RPRS WITH PRIVATELY KNOWN PRODUCTION COSTS 9
and R takes place in an ever changing environment where production cost, demand
conditions, and thus the efﬁcient retail price vary from period to period. Moreover,
it seems plausible that the manufacturer is better informed about some aspects of
this environment—particularly his costs of production. As we will see, repetition
of trade still allows parties to coordinate on an efﬁcient outcome by means of a
relational contract. However, with M holding private information, some form of
communication from M to the R—such as by means of RPRs—becomes crucial.
3 RPRs with Privately Known Production Costs
In this section, we extend our analysis to a setting where (i) the manufacturer’s
costs of productionvary from period to period, and (ii) themanufacturer holds privy
information on these costs. Concerning the former, note that we need not literally
interpret our setting as one in which it is precisely the same good which is being
sold in every period. It may indeed be more natural to interpret the periods of the
model as ‘product cycles’ where, in each period, the retailer introduces a new or
improved version of the product traded in the supply chain (such as a new drug, a
new book, or a new car model).17
In this situation, surplus-maximizing coordination between M and R crucially
requires some way for the former to communicate the current level of costs to the
latter. This section formalizes the point that this can be accomplished by means
of RPRs.
3.1 The Setup
In each stage game, we now assume the following sequence of events:
1. marginal costs c are (independently) drawn from some publicly known distri-
bution F(c) over [c,c] and observed only by M;18,19
2. M sets a wholesale price w and communicates an RPR ˜ p to R;
3. R sets a retail price p;
4. stage game proﬁts pM = (w−c) D(p) and pR = (p−w) D(p) are realized.
17This interpretation of course suggests the possibility of demand varying from period to period
as well. We will return to this in Section 4.1.2.
18Equivalently, the model captures a situation in which (i) R can observe M’s costs c, but (ii) c
is the sum of inherent efﬁciency and cost-reducing efforts (both privately known to M). This iso-
morphism is completely analogous to that between the Baron and Myerson (1982) model and the
Laffont and Tirole (1986) model, respectively, in the context of monopoly regulation.
19The simplifying assumption that costs are independent across periods can easily be relaxed.3 RPRS WITH PRIVATELY KNOWN PRODUCTION COSTS 10
Observe that, given w, R’s payoff in the stage game is independent of c, so that
there are no signaling effects: the equilibrium of the stage game corresponds to that
under common knowledge of c. In extension to Section 2’s analysis, we let w(c)
and p(w) denote M and R’s respective equilibrium strategies in the stage game,
and we let pM(c) and pR(c) denote their resulting equilibrium payoffs.20 Note that
pM(c) > 0 and pR(c) > 0 for all c, as each party can always ensure itself an non-
negative margin (M by setting w high enough, R by setting p high enough).
Moreover, we let p(p,c) ≡ (p − c)   D(p) denote joint surplus for any cost
realization c and any price p set by R, and we let p∗(c) ≡ argmaxpp(p,c) and
p∗(c)≡p[p∗(c),c] denotethejoint-surplusmaximizingprice and themaximaljoint
surplus, respectively. In the following, for brevity, we will frequently refer to p∗ as
the efﬁcient retail price; that is, efﬁciency will refer to the supply chain’s surplus
being maximized.
Furthermore, we will make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. D[p∗(c)] > 0 for all c ∈ [c,c].
By assumption 1, M’s private information concerns only the scale at which the
market should efﬁciently be supplied—not whether it should be supplied or not.
Asabove,collusionbetweenM andRwillbedesirablebecausepM(c)+pR(c)<
p∗(c) for any c due to double marginalization. However, the problem with efﬁcient
collusion is that the efﬁcient retail price p∗ depends on c. Indeed, to the extent that
joint-proﬁt maximization corresponds to the standard monopoly-pricing problem,
the following comparative statics are immediate (see the Appendix for a formal
proof):
Lemma 1. 0 < ¶p∗/¶c < 1, and ¶p∗/¶c < 0.
Thus, the joint-surplus maximizing price p∗ is increasing in c, whereas both the
overall margin p∗−c and joint proﬁts p∗ are decreasing in c.
Consequently, R can set the efﬁcient retail price p∗ only if there is some form
of communication about c from M to R. In the following, we will investigate how a
relational vertical contract with RPRs can overcome the problems of informational
dispersion and double marginalization, thereby ensuring efﬁciency of the supply
chain.
20Formally, equilibrium strategies in the stage game are p(w) ≡ argmaxp(p−w) D(p), w(c) ≡
argmaxw(w−c) D(p(w)), and equilibrium payoffs are pM(c) ≡ [w(c)−c] D[p(w(c))], pM(c) ≡
[p(w(c))−w(c)] D[p(w(c))].3 RPRS WITH PRIVATELY KNOWN PRODUCTION COSTS 11
3.2 The Relational Vertical Contract
Generally, theaboverepeated gamewillagainhostamyriadofequilibria. In thefol-
lowing, we will focus on a special class of equilibria, which will also make clearer
the role of the RPR in the game:
Deﬁnition 1. An efﬁcient relational contract with self-enforced price recommenda-
tions (ERCP) is an equilibrium in which, for some function w(c), parties take the
following actions along the equilibrium path:
(a) in any period with cost realization c, M sets w = w(c) and recommends ˜ p =
p∗(c);
(b) R sets p = ˜ p.
Conceptually, ERCPs are a subset of equilibria which establish a self-reinforc-
ing, implicit mutual agreement between M and R, where this agreement substitutes
for a court-enforceable contract asking (i) R to adhere to M’s price recommendation
˜ p, and (ii) M to recommend the efﬁcient retail price p∗ and to adhere to a certain
schedule in setting w, where this schedule is a function of true costs c. Indeed,
keeping this interpretation in mind will be useful for the following analysis.
Our focus on efﬁcient relational contracts is motivated by the fact that, as we
shall see shortly, if players are sufﬁciently patient, then there exists an ERCP. More-
over, we will show that, given sufﬁcient patience, ERCPs can split this efﬁcient sur-
plus in an essentially arbitrary way (by choice of the w(c)-schedule). Consequently,
the issues of efﬁciency and distributionare separable in the sense that any inefﬁcient
equilibrium is strictly Pareto dominated by some ERCP.21, 22
ERCPs leave two elements of players’ strategies unspeciﬁed: (i) parties’ off-
equilibrium strategies, and (ii) w(c), the wholesale price schedule—which essen-
tially describes how equilibrium proﬁts are to be shared. Thus completed, agents’
strategies must form an equilibrium in the sense that parties ﬁnd it unproﬁtable to
deviate from their respective strategies both on and off the equilibrium path.
To understand how the relational contract can discipline deviations from the
equilibrium path, it is important to observe that there are two classes of deviations:
(i) deviations which are (eventually) observed by the other party, and (ii) deviations
21See Levin(2003)forasimilarargument. Themaindifferenceis thatLevinﬁndsthis separability
between efﬁciency and distribution for arbitrary ﬁxed discount factors, because his model allows for
ﬁxed transfers between parties in each period. We could reproduce Levin’s exact argument in our
model by giving parties a one-off chance for initial ﬁxed transfers before the ﬁrst round of trade
(‘installment transfers’).
22Another restrictionimplicit in our deﬁnitionof ERCP is that the schedule by which w is set (i.e.,
the agreed-upon division of surplus) is assumed stationary. Given that parties discount at the same
rate, this restriction involves no loss of generality: It does not affect the level of d required for an
ERCP with arbitrary division of expected discounted payoffs to be sustainable.3 RPRS WITH PRIVATELY KNOWN PRODUCTION COSTS 12
which are not. More speciﬁcally, R can deviate by setting a retail price p which
does not correspond to the price ˜ p recommended to him by M. Such a deviation
will be observed by M at the end of the current stage game.23 For M, in turn,
there exist both observable deviations and unobservable deviations. Observable
deviations consist in proposing a combination of wholesale price w and RPR ˜ p
which is ‘unreasonable’ in the sense that this combination never occurs along the
equilibrium path for any realization of c. More formally, R will immediately detect
a deviation if M sets a w and recommends a ˜ p such that there exists no ˜ c ∈ [c,c]
with w = w(˜ c) and ˜ p = p∗(˜ c). Unobservable deviations for M, on the other hand,
consist in setting a w and recommending a ˜ p for which there exists a ˜ c ∈ [c,c] such
that w = w(˜ c) and ˜ p = p∗(˜ c).24
Intuitively,observabledeviationscanbedisciplinedbyappropriatetriggerstrate-
gies which trigger future losses (‘punishments’) for these deviations if parties are
sufﬁciently patient (and short-term deviation payoffs are bounded). For the mo-
ment, we shall therefore assume that parties avoid observable deviations and con-
sider how the remaining unobservable deviations can be disciplined. We will make
more precise how observable deviations can be disciplined in Section 3.4 below.
3.3 Unobservable Deviations: Truthful Revelation of c
Formally, unobservable deviations involve M setting ˆ p and w such that there ex-
ists ˜ c ∈ [c,c] with w = w(˜ c) and ˆ p = p∗(˜ c). Such deviations are equivalent to M
submitting a false cost report ˜ c ∈ [c,c] to R and, given M’s private knowledge of c,
are not detectable by R. Moreover, given that p∗(c) is strictly monotone in c (see
Lemma 1), adherence to the relational contract (i.e., reporting the efﬁcient price) is
equivalent to requiring a truthful cost report from M in every period. As the fol-
lowing result shows, this in turn places heavy restrictions on parties’ equilibrium
payoffs:
Proposition 1. In any ERCP in which both parties avoid all observable deviations,
M will recommend ˜ p = p∗(c) if and only if R’s equilibrium proﬁt is independent
of c.
See the Appendix for the proof.
23Even if M cannot directly observe the retail price set by R, given that D′ < 0, he can always
perfectly infer it from observation of his proﬁts.
24More speciﬁcally, such deviations are not detectable with certainty. In our repeated context,
R may of course collect the implicit costs reports ˜ c made in every period, compare the series of re-
ports to the prior distribution f(c), and initiate punishmentbased on some statistical test for whether
the reported ˜ c’s represent independent draws from f(c). However, such a strategy necessarily in-
volves a positive probability of punishment on the equilibrium path and is thus weakly dominated.3 RPRS WITH PRIVATELY KNOWN PRODUCTION COSTS 13
The simple intuition underlying Proposition 1 is that M will ﬁnd it optimal (in
fact, strictly optimal) to truthfully reveal his costs c only if he is made residual
claimant tothe effect ofcost-savingson jointsurplus—whichrequires that R’sequi-
librium proﬁts pR be independent of c.25
By Proposition 1, ERCPs can be fully parameterized by R’s (constant) equilib-
rium rent pR ∈ R: the level of this rent is the only remaining degree of freedom in
designing the ERCP.
3.4 Observable Deviations and Trigger Strategies
Giventhatunobservabledeviationsaredisciplined(bymakingM residualclaimant),
it remains to make sure that parties avoid observable deviations as well. In the fol-
lowing, we consider trigger strategies in which players revert indeﬁnitely to their
respective equilibrium strategies of the stage game (w(c) and p(w), respectively) as
soon as somebody observably deviates from the equilibrium path.26
ForM, observabledeviationsconsistinsettingawand recommendinga ˜ p which
do not match for any c. Such deviations will immediately be detected by R (i.e.,
within the stage game) and, according to his trigger strategy, cause immediate re-
version to his best response in the one-shot game, p(w). Consequently, M’s best ob-
servable deviation has him set w(c) and earn stage-game equilibrium proﬁts pM(c).







Since (1) must hold for all c, it must also hold in expectation (over c), imply-
ing E[pM(c)−pM(c)] > 0,27 so that the right-hand side of (1) is non-negative.
Thus, for any d, deviation can only be proﬁtable in the ﬁrst place for c such that
pM(c) < pM(c). Moreover, since net deviation gains (the left-hand side of (1)) are
bounded,28 it immediately follows that, for E[pM(c)] > E[pM(c)] (if M’s expected
gains from the relational contract are strictly positive), there exists a d large enough
25This result is reminiscent, for instance, of the Loeb-Magat proposal in the context of monopoly
regulation (Loeb and Magat, 1979): One way to induce a monopolist with private cost information
to set socially efﬁcient prices is to award the ﬁrm a transfer the size of consumer surplus for any
price it chooses, thus making the ﬁrm residual claimant on social surplus.
26We do not claim that these off-equilibriumstrategies constitute optimal penal codes in the sense
of establishing equilibriumat a minimal requireddiscount factor. As shown by Mailath et al. (2008),
Abreu’s (1988) classic result on optimal penal codes is not generally applicable in the context of
repeated extensive-form stage games.
27Observe that this condition is equivalent to M’s ex-ante participation constraint, describing his
willingness to enter the relational contract (rather than repeated one-shot play) in the ﬁrst place.
Thus, M’s participation is implied by his incentive constraints.





pM(c)+pR = p∗(c), ∀c
Figure 2: Achievable Average Payoffs for d Large Enough.
to satisfy condition (1) for all c. Thus, provided sufﬁcient patience, M will volun-
tarily adhere to the relational contract even if current proﬁts pM(c) fall below his
equilibrium proﬁts from the one-shot stage game: The future long-run gains from
cooperation will make it worth incurring this loss. For future reference, note in
particular that M can be induced to adhere to the relational contract even if current
proﬁts pM(c) are negative.
For R, in turn, any deviation (i.e., setting p  = ˜ p) will earn him the expected pay-
off of the stage-game equilibrium, Ec[pR(c)], in all future periods. Since this future
stream of expected payoffs is independent of the deviation chosen (and the current
level of c), R’s optimal deviation will simply have him play his best response in
the one-shot game, p = p(w(c)), which will earn him [p(w(c))−w(c)] D[p(w(c))]
instead of pR in the deviation period. Hence, R’s incentive constraint can be formu-
lated as






where the left-hand side is non-negative (for any w(c), R can always obtain pR by
setting p = p∗(c)), implying pR > E[pR(c)].
Moreover, the left-hand side of (2) is again bounded, so that, for pR > E[pR(c)],
there necessarily exists a d large enough so that condition (2) is satisﬁed for all c.29
In sum, this establishes the following result:
Proposition2. Ifpartiesaresufﬁcientlypatient,anyERCPwithE[pM(c)]>E[pM(c)]
and pR >E[pR(c)] (i.e., such that each party’s expected equilibrium payoffs strictly
exceed expected payoffs from the stage game equilibrium) can be supported.
Fig. 2 illustrates this result: Through different choices of the w(c)-schedule
(representing moves along the bold line in Fig. 2), different ERCPs with different
29Again, R’s participation constraint is implied by his incentive constraints (see Fn. 27).3 RPRS WITH PRIVATELY KNOWN PRODUCTION COSTS 15
divisions of expected discounted payoffs can be implemented. The shaded area
shows expected payoffs resulting from inefﬁcient equilibria. Fig. 2 visualizes our
earlier claim (used to justify our focus on ERCP) that, provided sufﬁcient patience,
any equilibrium is strictly Pareto-dominated by some ERCP.
Inanalogy to thestandard Folk result, different ERCPs will ofcourse requiredif-
ferent critical discount factors. Generally, a high discount factor is required when-
ever a party’s short-run gains from deviation are high relative to its future gains
from cooperation. Speciﬁcally, this means that higher discount factors will be re-
quired to implement ERCPs with a more asymmetric division of the surplus from
cooperation, leading to ERCPs toward the ends of the bold line in Fig. 2 (we will
further discuss the role of sufﬁcient patience in Section 4.2.1 below).
3.5 The Role of RPRs in the Relational Contract
The above relational contract suggests the following economic rationale for RPRs:
They permit M to (implicitly) communicate the current level of costs c, and thereby
enables R to set the conditionally optimal retail price p.
Strictly speaking, however, this additional communication is unnecessary if M’s
equilibrium announcement of w permits R to perfectly infer the current c in ev-
ery round, which in turn is the case if w(c) is strictly monotone in c.30 As the
following result (proven in the Appendix) shows, there are situations in which the
w(c)-schedule is non-monotone:
Lemma 2. sign(¶w/¶c) = sign[pM(c)].
Thus, the retail price will be increasing (decreasing) in c whenever M’s stage-
game payoff is positive(negative). To understand this, recall that the w(c)-schedule
must be chosen so as to induce M to recommend the optimal price p∗(c). Now, for
any c and starting from ˆ p = p∗(c), a marginal increase in the price recommendation
will decrease demand. For a ﬁxed w = w(c), this will decrease his proﬁts if his
markup w(c)−c is positive, and increase it if the markup is negative. To neutralize
this effect, recommending a higher price (pretending to have higher costs) must
therefore be accompanied by a rise in w if M’s markup is positive, whereas it must
be accompanied by a fall in w if M’s markup is negative.
30More speciﬁcally, for any ERCP (and the accompanying w(c)-schedule), rather than ask R to
adhere to the recommendation ˜ p, the relational contract could instead ask R to infer c from w in each
period and set the conditionally optimal p∗(c). Equivalently, this could be achieved by specifying
a mapping from w to p as part of the relational agreement, to which R adheres. In either case, the
price recommendation ˜ p (or more generally, communication of more than w from M to R in every















Figure 3: Comparing Proﬁts and Prices: ERCP vs. One-Shot Equilibrium.
To understand why pM(c) may well be negative (for certain values of c), recall
from our previous discussion in Section 3.4 that this is unproblematic so long as
E[pM(c)] > E[pM(c)], so that participation in the ERCP is proﬁtable for M in the
long run. Note however that, since pM(c) = p∗(c)−pR, where ¶p∗/¶c < 0 by
Lemma1 and ¶pR/¶c=0 by Proposition 1, pM(c) is strictlydecreasing in c, which
implies that ¶w/¶c can change signs at most once—from positive to negative (see
the illustration in Fig. 3, panel (a)).
In sum, while the w(c)-schedule is not necessarily non-monotone, it may well
be in situations where M’s expected share in joint proﬁts from the relationship are
low—as might be expected if M has low bargaining power at the time the relational
contract is negotiated. In such situations, the RPR ˜ p forms an indispensable part
of the efﬁcient relational agreement in terms of allowing M to signal current cost
conditions to the retail-price setter R.
3.6 The Economics of the ERCP
Our above explanation of RPRs rests on two ingredients: (i) repeated vertical trade,
and (ii) private information of the manufacturer on his production costs. To un-
derstand the joint economic role of these two ingredients, recall from Section 2
that repetition of trade alone does not justify the use of RPRs because parties may
achieve joint-surplus maximization without it. Second, it is easy to see that, in a
one-shot version of the game in which M privately knows c, there is no use for
RCPs either: Given any announced wholesale price w, R’s optimal choice of p is
unaffected byhis beliefabout c, sothat R willdisregardany communicationabout c.
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from manufacturer to retailer: M’s private knowledge on production costs gives
him something to signal about in the ﬁrst place, whereas it is the repetition of trade
which makes R care about such a signal.
Eventually,given these two ingredients, RPRs may be seen as an instrument
which, togetherwitha simplelinear transfer schemebetween M and R (and together
with an ‘implicit understanding’ between the two) provides an observationally sim-
ple solution to a complex coordination problem.
There are howevertwo minorcaveats to this interpretationof RPRs. First, RPRs
(i.e., communicationoftheefﬁcientretailprice p∗(c))areonlyoneofmanypossible
ways for M to signal information on c to R. Formally, communication of any other
strictlymonotonetransformationofcwilldoaswell. Second,as seeninSection3.5,
given communication of w(c) and the single-peakedness of the w(c)-schedule, any
additional binary form of communication (i.e., ‘c is low’ vs. ‘c is high’) in fact
sufﬁces for R to correctly infer c.
Concerning these caveats, we shall for now contend ourselves by the fact that,
giventhat some additionalcommunicationconcerning c is necessary, an RPR seems
like a very natural instrument to achieve this. Indeed, this form of communication
puts the least computational burden on the retailer, who must simply follow the
manufacturer’s recommendation.31 We will return to these caveats in Section 4,
wherewe willargue that (i)theform ofcommunicationused becomes unambiguous
once consumers respond to the RPR (as is assumed elsewhere in the literature), and
that (ii)theRPR can in fact be used to communicatemorethan just cost-information
from M to R.
3.7 Implications for Markups at the Wholesale and Retail Level
A key feature of our above analysis is that equilibrium pricing both at the wholesale
and at the retail level is not driven by myopic concerns, but rather by concerns
for future cooperation. As such, the analysis’ predictions on how margins at the
retail and wholesale level vary in c are quite different from those derived in a static
framework.
Speciﬁcally, in our model, markups at the wholesale level are driven by Propo-
sition 1, which establishes that R’s equilibrium proﬁts must be independent of c.
For the assumed linear transfer scheme, R’s equilibrium proﬁts under the relational
contract are pR(c) = [p∗(c)−w(c)] D[p∗(c)]. Thus, the requirement that pR(c) be
constant in c immediately translates into a requirement on R’s equilibrium markup
p∗(c)−w(c): To keep pR(c) constant, R’s equilibrium markup must be inversely
31More precisely, RPRs will be the efﬁcient communication device in a world with boundedly
rational retailers. This role of RPRs has previously been suggested by Faber and Janssen (2008).3 RPRS WITH PRIVATELY KNOWN PRODUCTION COSTS 18
related to equilibrium demand:
Corollary 1. The wholesale-price schedule w(c) in the relational contract must
be such that R’s equilibrium markup, p∗(c)−w(c), varies in inverse proportion to




for some pR ∈ R.
Since equilibrium demand is strictly decreasing in c (recall that ¶p∗/¶c > 0 by
Lemma 1 and ¶D/¶p < 0 by assumption), and since pR > E[pR(c)] > 0, R’s equi-
librium markup must therefore be increasing in c. Given that the overall markup
p∗(c)−c is strictly decreasing in c by Lemma 1, this immediately yields the fol-
lowing result concerning the (inverse) co-movement of margins at the wholesale
and retail level:
Corollary 2. M’s markup w−c is decreasing in c, whereas R’s markup p∗−w is
increasing in c.
The differences in predictions between one-shot play and repeated play are il-
lustrated in Fig. 3 which, for a speciﬁc (linear) demand function, shows prices and
proﬁts under the ERCP (for a certain level of pR) in panel (a), and prices and proﬁts
in the stage-game equilibrium in panel (b). Note, in particular, that R’s markup is
increasing under the ERCP (p∗(c)−w in panel (a)), whereas it is decreasing in the
stage game equilibrium ( ¯ p(c)− ¯ w(c) in panel (b)).
Thepossibilityofan‘inverse’relationshipbetweenwholesaleandretailmarkups
has previously been noted in the advertising literature. Steiner (1993, 717) empha-
sizes that the inverse association of wholesale and retail markups is a “prevalent
although not ubiquitous phenomenon” that has largely gone unnoticed in the eco-
nomics literature. Lal and Narasimhan (1996) show that manufacturer advertising
may actually give rise to inversely related margins by squeezing the retail margin
and increasing the producer margin.32
Note ﬁnally that keeping pR constant and strictly positive for all c is only pos-
sible if demand at the efﬁcient price is always strictly positive, which is why As-
sumption 1 (that private information does not concern whether the market should
be supplied or not) is crucial to our result.33
32Estimating a static successive monopoly model (similar to the stage game discussed in Section
2.1), Bresnahan and Reiss (1985) ﬁnd proportional markups in the U.S. automobile industry.
33One might, however, easily extend our analysis also to this case by allowing for a transfer
from M to R for c such that D(p∗(c)) = 0. Such a payment may be thought of as a compensation for
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4 Extensions and Limitations
This section considers a number of relevant extensions and limitations of our anal-
ysis in Section 3.
4.1 Extensions
We begin with the case where RPRs communicate not only to the R, but also to
consumers.34 Letting the demand function depend both on the actual retail price
and the RPR, we allow for behavioral aspects in consumer demand. Speciﬁcally,
we examine the notion that demand may be stimulated by ‘moon pricing’ (i.e., the
practiceofsetting‘ﬁctitiously’highRPRs soastofoolconsumersintothinkingthey
are buying at bargain prices). We show that, if consumer demand is maximized at
some discount from the RPR, the supply chain can maximize its surplus by means
of a simple variation on the relational contract in which the RPR is systematically
higher than the intended retail price. That is, R’s downward deviation from the RPR
is itself part of the implicit agreement.
Next, we consider a setting in which not only production costs, but also demand
may vary across periods. This is natural if the periods in our analysis are inter-
preted as product cycles, where a new period represents the introduction of a new
or improved product. We ﬁnd that supply-chain efﬁciency is still attainable in the
context of a relational agreement. Moreover, we argue that, if the retailer has better
projections about consumer demand than the retailer, then the RPR becomes even
more crucial as a communication device.
4.1.1 ‘Moon Pricing’
The rationale for RPRs in Section 3 was derived under the assumption that con-
sumers’ willingness to pay for the ﬁnal good is independent of the RPR ˜ p, so that
consumer demand depends only on the retail price. Behavioral work suggests, how-
ever, that consumer demand may depend on both actual and recommended retail
price. In particular, the direct demand effect of a RPR may derive from ‘mental
accounting’ on consumers’ behalf (Thaler, 1985) or from loss aversion if the retail
price exceeds the RPR (Puppe and Rosenkranz, 2006). In this section, we bring
these two approaches together.
Suppose that consumer demand is of the form D(p, ˜ p), that is, demand is imme-
diately affected by the RPR ˜ p. Facing this type of consumer demand, joint-surplus
maximizationnow implies that, for any c, the supply chain must choose the surplus-
maximizing combination of retail price p and RPR ˜ p. For any c, let p∗(c), ˜ p∗(c)
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denote this surplus-maximizing combination. To ﬁx ideas, let us assume that, for
any p and c, consumer demand is maximal if consumers are offered the good at
some discount a >0 from the recommended price ˜ p, so that p∗(c)=(1−a)  ˜ p∗(c)
for any c.
It is straightforward to see that, in this case, the supply chain can maximize its
total surplus with a simple variation on the ERCP where parties take the following
actions on the equilibrium path: Instead of M recommending ˜ p = p∗(c) and R set-
ting p = ˜ p for any c, M instead recommends ˜ p = ˜ p∗(c) and R sets p = (1−a)  ˜ p.
In other words, M intentionally recommends a price above the intended ﬁnal price
(‘moon pricing’), and R marks the ﬁnal price down correspondingly.35
In this type of relational agreement, RPRs take on a double function: They
extract the maximal willingness to pay from consumers while at the same time
communicating the necessary information from M to R for implementation of the
surplus-maximizing retail price. To relate this to our main analysis above, recall
from our discussion in Section 3.6 that if consumer demand is independent of the
RPR, communication of the optimal retail price p∗(c) is only one of many ways to
get the necessary information from M to R (communicating any monotone trans-
formation of p∗(c) will do as well). If, on the other hand, consumer demand does
depend on what is communicated (i.e., on the RPR), then ﬁrms will pick the mode
of communication which maximizes joint surplus.
Notice ﬁnally that, in this case, it is actually a part of the implicit agreement be-
tween M and R for the latter to deviate from the recommendation—but in a speciﬁc
way which is itself part of the implicit agreement.
4.1.2 RPRs with Varying Demand Conditions
As suggested above, a natural way to interpret ‘periods’ in our model is in terms
of product cycles, where a new period represents the introduction of a new variety
(a new pharmaceutical drug, a new car model, etc.). Such a new variety may be
associated with different consumer demand, as in the case of a car for a new market
segment or a drug with new treatment characteristics. To allow for this, we extend
our previous analysis to settings where not only the costs of production, but also
demand changes across periods.
Particularly, we assume that the demand function in any period is given by
D(p,q), where the demand parameter q is independently drawn (along with c) at
the beginning of each stage, and where ¶D/¶q > 0. Supply-chain efﬁciency now
35Obviously,this typeofrelationalagreementcanbe implementedmoregenerallyforanydemand
function D(p, ˜ p) such that p∗(c) can be expressed as a function of ˜ p∗(c).4 EXTENSIONS AND LIMITATIONS 21
requires the retail price to be tailored also to market demand in each period, so
p = p∗(c,q) ≡ argmaxp(p−c) D(p,q).
4.1.2.1 Commonly Known Demand Conditions
The introduction of variability in demand does not change our previous analysis
signiﬁcantly if q is observed by both M and R at the beginning of each stage game.
Given sufﬁcient patience, supply-chain efﬁciency is again attainable—essentially
by conditioning the above relational agreement on q, in addition. The only caveat
is that the variation in demand dilutes the clear-cut comparative predictions derived
in Section 3.7 concerning the variationof margins at the manufacturing vs. the retail
level.
More speciﬁcally, supply-chain efﬁciency can be attained by a simple extension
to the ERCP which stipulates that, along the equilibrium path, (i) M recommends
˜ p = p∗(c,q) in every period and sets w according to some schedule w(c,q), which
is again part of the implicit agreement, and (ii) that R sets p = ˜ p in every period.
By straightforward extension of Proposition 1, R’s equilibrium proﬁt pR must be
independent of c for any givenlevel of q, and givensufﬁcient patience, there always
exist off-equilibrium strategies to enforce the extended ERCP.36
Consequently, supply-chain efﬁciency is attainable through this extended ERCP
(for d large enough) if and only if (i) R’s equilibrium proﬁt is independent of c (for
any q), and (ii) each party’s expected proﬁt from the relational contract exceeds it’s
expected proﬁt from the one-shot equilibrium.
While efﬁciency is thereby attainable, the variability in demand signiﬁcantly
relaxes our previous restrictions on how the wholesale price and, as a consequence,
markups must vary across periods. Essentially, while pR must be independent of c,
it may vary arbitrarily in q. Thus, while efﬁciency implies that M must bear the full
variability in joint surplus due to variations in c, there is no similar restriction on
how the variation in joint surplus due to demand ﬂuctuations are to be shared.37,38
36Formally, the no-deviation constraints (1) and (2), conditioned on q and with expectations on
the right-hand side taken over c and q, must hold for every q. In analogy to our above analysis, it
is easy to see that, so long as E[pR(q)] > E[pR(c,q)] and E[pM(c,q)] > E[pM(c,q)], the extended
ERCP can be supported by reversion to the stage-game equilibrium in case of deviation (where
pi(c,q) denotes i’s equilibrium proﬁts in the stage game).
37Since w(c,q) = p∗(c,q)−pR(q)/D[p∗(c,q)] in straightforward extension to Corollary 1, and
since pR(q) may vary arbitrarily in q (the only restriction being a lower bound on its expectated
value), w(c,q) may vary arbitrarily in q.
38As above, different extended ERCP will of course require different critical discount factors. It
may therefore be possible to derive prediction on the w(c,q) schedule under the additional assump-
tion that, for any expected division of surplus, parties pick the w(c,q) schedule so as to minimize
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4.1.2.2 Superior Demand Information on Manufacturer’s Behalf
If we interpret the periods in our models in terms of the introduction of new prod-
ucts, then it is easy to imagine situations in which, at the time retail prices must be
determined, the manufacturer in fact has a much better idea of the size of demand to
be expected: The car manufacturer is likely to have performed an extensive market
analysis before developing the new model, and the manufacturer of pharmaceuti-
cals will know more about the (demand-relevant) properties of his newly developed
drug than his retail outlets. Therefore, at the time the retailer sets his price for the
good, the manufacturer enjoys superior information not only on his costs of produc-
tion, but also on projected demand. As we argue in this section, the RPR can then
serve to communicate both these aspects to the retailer, thereby extending the role
of RPRs as a communication device by a further dimension.39
To this end, assume again that c and q are drawn anew at the beginning of each
period, but assume now that both are observed only by M. As we will argue in the
following, supply-chain efﬁciency (i.e., achieving a retail price of p∗(c,q)) is again
attainable by means of a simple extension to the above ERCP.
To understand the mechanics, note that there is an important difference between
the nature of M’s private information on c and his private information on q: While
R does not know q at the time he sets the price, given that ¶D/¶q > 0, he can
perfectly infer it by the end of the period through his observation of actual demand.
Consequently, in terms of the categorization of possible deviations in Section 3,
M deviating from the truthful (implicit) communication of q constitutes a devia-
tion which is eventually observable by R, and therefore can again be disciplined
by adequate off-equilibrium strategies (i.e., the threat of terminating cooperation
upon deviation). Enforcement of truthful revelation of q from M to R is therefore
analogous to the enforcement of R’s adherence to the RPR.
What makes a formal analysis slightly more involved is a second way in which
M’s private information on q differs from his information on c: In contrast to infor-
mation on production costs, R has an immediate interest in information on demand
in the sense that his best response in the stage game depends on his beliefs concern-
ing q. Consequently, R has an incentiveto infer somethingabout q from M’s choice
of w and ˜ p. For this reason, even in the stage game, there may be some (imperfect)
signaling from M to R, so that characterizing the equilibrium of the one-shot game
is more involved (and in contrast to our discussion in Section 3.5, the RPR may now
39While the economics literature has traditionally focussed on the case in which it is the retailer
who enjoys superior information on demand, the role of private information on behalf of the man-
ufacturer—particularly when it comes to introducing new or improved goods to the market—has
long been stressed in the managementand marketingliterature (cf. Chu, 1992;Desai and Srinivasan,
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play a role for communication even in the stage game).40
These technical challenges notwithstanding, for the purpose of arguing that an
efﬁcient relational contract exists, it sufﬁces to observe that, whatever the precise
nature of signaling, the one-shot equilibrium will still be inefﬁcient from the point
of view of maximizing the supply chain’s surplus.41 Thus, given that (i) the short-
run gains from deviating from the extended ERCP are bounded and (ii) given that
both parties incur strictly positive future losses if cooperation terminates, the above
trigger strategies (reversion to stage-game equilibrium strategies upon any observ-
abledeviation)can stillimplementtheERCP. Moreover, inthis extendedERCP, the
RPR now has the more complex function of communicating information on both c
and q.
4.2 Limitations
We now discuss some of the limitations of our approach, and how they may be
alleviated. We begin with the requirement that parties are sufﬁciently patient to
make the relational contract self-enforcing. Next, we explain that allowing for non-
linear (rather than linear) tariff schedules would leave our key result on disciplining
non-observable deviations unaffected and, if anything, enlarge the scope for verti-
cal cooperation using relational contracts. Finally, we sketch the extent to which
our analysis of bilateral vertical relationships generalizes to settings with multiple
manufacturers and retailers.
4.2.1 The Role of ‘Sufﬁcient Patience’
To assure the existence of off-equilibrium strategies which support the relational
contract, our analysis has assumed parties to be ‘sufﬁciently patient’. Quite gen-
erally, we interpret this assumption as a useful polar counterpart to to the case of
parties being completely myopic (i.e., the non-repeated stage game), where linear
transfer schedules necessarily lead to double marginalization.
Note, however, that we have not just relied on this assumption to guarantee the
existence of a relational contract, but also to argue that the surplus from such a
40Generally speaking, in the spirit of the usual analysis of cheap-talk games (cf. Crawford and
Sobel, 1982),whether and how much signaling occurs in the stage-game equilibriumwill depend on
how strongly M and R’s interests diverge,which in turn depends on the speciﬁcation of how demand
depends on q.
41Formally, it is easy to see that in any perfectly separating equilibrium of the stage game (i.e.,
whenever R can perfectly infer c and q), M would have an incentive to deviate so as to strategically
lower R’s price. Hence, there cannot be perfect separation in equilibrium,implying that the outcome
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contract may be arbitrarily split (which in turn justiﬁes the focus on efﬁcient con-
tracts). As argued in Section 3.4, the assumption of sufﬁcient patience becomes
particularly crucial if parties’ bargaining power is very asymmetric at the time the
terms of the relational contract are ‘negotiated’ (i.e., when parties coordinate on
the relevant w(c) schedule): More asymmetric splits of the surplus generated by
the relational contract require higher discount factors. Therefore, our assumption
that parties coordinate on an efﬁcient ERCP becomes increasingly critical for more
asymmetric bargaining positions in the sense that distribution and efﬁciency may
no longer be separable. A straightforward way of dealing with this limitation is to
allow for one-time ﬁxed transfers at the time the relational contract is negotiated
(see Footnote 21).
Alternatively, and to address the issue of limited patience more generally, one
would need to explicitly characterize the set of feasible expected average payoffs
for ﬁxed d.
4.2.2 Linear Transfer Schemes
We have deliberately focused on the use of linear transfer schemes to govern trade
between manufacturer and retailer. This restriction concerns trade both on and off
the equilibrium path, that is, within the relational contract and in the one-shot equi-
librium (which parties revert to if the relational contract breaks down).
Our analysis easily extends to situations in which parties may use non-linear
contracts on the equilibrium path. Particularly, the proof of Proposition 1 does not
rely on any speciﬁc functional form of the transfer scheme, so that truthful reve-
lation of cost information requires independence of R’s proﬁts far more generally.
The remaining observable deviations may then be disciplined as above (where non-
linear transfers schemes may be used, however, to reduce parties’ deviation proﬁts,
thereby reducing the critical discount factor).
Allowing for non-linear transfer schemes off the equilibrium path, in contrast,
has more far-reaching consequences: Given the assumed sequence of moves in the
stage game, non-linear contracts will ensure supply-chain efﬁciency, but also en-
able M to extract the entire surplus of the supply chain.42 Consequently, no ERCP
other than the inﬁnite repetition of this stage-game equilibrium will be supportable.
That is, permitting non-linear transfer schemes off the equilibrium path implies that
linear schemes can no longer be employed to achieve efﬁciency in the context of a
relational contract. However, this seemingly threatening insight simply highlights
anotherperhapsstrongerassumptionconcerningthe(standard)structureofthestage
game: BylettingM proposeatake-it-or-leave-itoffer, heisimplicitlygivenabsolute
42It is easily seen that this is also true if M holds private information on production costs and/or
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bargaining power in negotiating the terms of exchange. Less asymmetric bargain-
ing positions in the stage game will give both parties strictly positive proﬁts in the
stage game equilibrium, and thereby restore the possibility of sustaining less trivial
ERCPs (with linear or non-linear transfer schemes).43
4.2.3 Bilateral Relationships
For simplicity, we have focused on bilateral vertical relationships. Yet, our analysis
generalizes naturally to a setting where a single manufacturer M sells through I re-
tailers Ri,i =1,...,I. It can be shown that, if retailers observe each other’s price rec-
ommendations ˜ pi, avoiding unobservable deviations by the manufacturer requires
that the sum of R1,...,RI’s equilibrium proﬁts is independent of the manufacturer’s
marginal cost c.44
Moreover, our analysis is easily extended to a setting where K competing man-
ufacturers M1,...,MK sell through distinct retailers R1,...,RK, facing asymmetric
information about competing supply chains. In analogy to our above analysis, sup-
ply chains may now use their RPRs to facilitate internal vertical coordination so as
to become more effective competitors in the market for the ﬁnal product.
The extension to the case with interlocking relationships (Rey and Verg´ e, 2007)
between manufacturers and retailers is more complex. To see this, note that the
pattern of information exchange is far from obvious if two competing manufactur-
ers Mi,i = 1,2, sell through two retailers Rj, j = 1,2, carrying both products. It
is conceivable, for instance, that a vertical communication from M1 to R1 (e.g., a
privateRPR) ispassedon acrosssupplychainsto M2 (and viceversa), creatingman-
ifold options for strategic information exchange. Moreover, in such a setting, there
are many conceivable coalitional constellations for collusion (such as collusion be-
tween manufacturers, between retailers, or between certain pairs of manufacturers
and retailers). Pursuing this line of research is beyond the scope of this paper, but
it might shed new light on the theory of information exchange in oligopoly (Raith,
1996). Extending the analysis along these lines might also be relevant from the per-
spective of antitrust policy. It would be interesting, for instance, to study whether
vertical information exchange across supply chains can substitutefor unlawful hori-
zontal information exchange about retail prices, allowing supply chains to establish
both vertical coordination and horizontal collusion.
43As such, even under the assumption of linear contracts, the stage-game equilibrium payoffs
pM(c) and pR(c) in our above analysis should more generally be reinterpreted as being dependent
on the assumed distribution of bargaining power.
44If retailerscannotobserveeachother’spricerecommendations(andthus cannotdetectdissonant
cost reports), M will recommendthe surplus-maximizingretail prices p∗(c) if and only if the sum of
R1,...,RI’s equilibrium proﬁts is independent of each individual cost report ˜ ci.5 CONCLUSION 26
5 Conclusion
This paper has formalized the notion that non-binding RPRs serve as a communica-
tion device facilitating coordination within vertical supply chains. Speciﬁcally, as-
suming(i)repeated trade, and (ii)privateinformationon behalfof themanufacturer,
we have shown that RPRs may be part of a relational contract communicating pri-
vate information from manufacturer to retailer that is indispensable for maximizing
jointsurplus. Thisrelational contract has three desirablefeatures: It is simple(using
linear pricing schemes only), places minimal computational burden on the retailer
(who must simply follow the RPR), and it is ﬂexible in terms of proﬁt distribution
among manufacturer and retailer. The relational contract predicts that wholesale
and retail margins are inversely related, which is inconsistent with standard (static)
theory, but broadly accepted in the advertising literature. We have demonstrated
that this relational vertical contract is self-enforcing provided that players are sufﬁ-
ciently patient.
This raises the question of why, in some industries, retailers appear to deviate
systematically from RPRs. An extended version of our analysis where RPRs com-
municate not only from manufacturer to retailer, but also to consumers, suggests a
possibleanswer. The relationalcontract can stillimplementthesurplus-maximizing
outcome,butRPRs nowplayadoublerole: Inadditiontocommunicatingprivatein-
formation to retailers, they extract the maximal willingness to pay from consumers.
As a result, actual retail prices may deviate systematically from RPRs along the
equilibrium path. In particular, manufacturers may deliberately recommend a price
above the intended retail price (‘moon pricing’).
Should non-binding RPRs be allowed or banned from an antitrust perspective?
By our reasoning, RPRs serve as a communication device which facilitates the co-
ordination of manufacturer and retailer, thereby improving supply-chain efﬁciency.
Yet, vertical supplychains may also (perhaps imperfectly)coordinatein the absence
of RPRs, so that a ban on RPRs will deteriorate (rather than eliminate)supply-chain
coordination. This makes it unclear how consumers will be affected by a ban on
RPRs. Moreover, we have argued that the communication via RPRs may also affect
consumers more directly, with potentially undesirable effects. In particular, RPRs
mayservetoexploitbehavioralconsumersand evenfacilitatecollusionamongcom-
peting supply chains. Overall, it therefore seems fair to say that the implications for
antitrust policy remain opaque. We hope to address this issue in future research.APPENDIX 27
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. To see that ¶p∗/¶c > 0, observe that for any c, p∗ maximizes p(p,c) =
(p−c)D(p). Since ¶2
¶p¶cp = − ¶
¶pD(p) > 0, the claim follows from elementary robust com-
parative statics.
To see that ¶p∗/¶c < 1, deﬁne m ≡ p−c. The problem may then be reformulated as
choosing m so as to maximize m D(m+c). Since ¶2
¶m¶c[m D(m+c)] = ¶
¶pD(p) < 0, the
claim is again implied by robust comparative statics.
Finally, by the envelope theorem, ¶p∗/¶c = −D(p∗) < 0.
Proof of Proposition 1. Observe ﬁrst that M picking a ( ˜ p,w) such that there exists no ˜ c ∈
[c,c] with ˜ =p∗(˜ c) and w = w(˜ c) would constitute an observable deviation on his behalf.
Thus, M’s problem may be equivalently formulated as choosing a cost-level ˜ c ∈ [c,c] and
then announcing the equilibrium prices corresponding to this cost level. With slight abuse
of notation, let pM(˜ c,c) ≡ p(p∗(˜ c),c)−pR(˜ c) denote M’s proﬁt for any such ˜ c and any true










¶pp(p∗(c),c) = 0 by deﬁnition of p∗(c), this establishes necessity of ¶pR/¶c = 0.
To establish sufﬁciency, note that pR being independent of c and the fact that p∗(c)
maximizes p( ,c) implies
pM(c,c) = p[p∗(c),c]−pR(c) = p[p∗(c),c]−pR(˜ c)
> p[p∗(˜ c),c]−pR(˜ c) = pM(˜ c,c)
(where the inequality is strict for any c such that p∗(c) is unique).
Proof of Lemma 2. In the context of the proof of Lemma 1, M’s proﬁts for any true cost
level c and any implicitly reported cost level ˜ c can be written as pM(˜ c,c) = [w(˜ c)−c] 
D[p∗(˜ c)]. Using this, the ﬁrst-order condition for (A.1) can be rewritten as
¶





from which it follows that sgn(¶w/¶c) = sgn(w(c)−c), which implies the claim.REFERENCES 28
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